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Bold	and	Newly	Independent,	or	Isolated	and	Cast	Adrift?	-	The	
Implications	of	Brexit	for	Intellectual	Property	Law	and	Policy		The	vote	by	the	British	public	 to	 leave	the	EU,	considered	as	a	remote	possibility	by	polling	companies	and	 financial	markets	alike,	has	nevertheless	 left	 the	EU	and	UK	 in	a	position	of	significant	uncertainty.		Whether	decided	on	the	basis	of	fears	over	immigration	(or,	as	some	may	 argue,	 outright	 xenophobia)	 and	 ‘euro-myths’	 peddled	 by	 unscrupulous	UK	 journalists	and	politicians	(Craig	2016,	p.455),	or	concerns	over	the	economy,	sovereignty	and	Britain’s	place	 in	 the	 world,	 the	 vote	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	with	 a	renewed	 impetus	 for	 Scottish	 independence,	 questions	 over	 the	 status	 of	Northern	 Ireland,	and	of	course,	Gibraltar.		Further	uncertainty	surrounds	the	resignation	of	David	Cameron	and	subsequent	appointment	of	Theresa	May	as	British	Prime	Minister,	the	appointment	of	Boris	Johnson	as	Foreign	Minister	and	David	Davis	as	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	EU,	and	the	somewhat	 parodied	 ‘Brexit	means	 Brexit’	 statement	 of	 the	 Prime	Minister	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	British	Government.		Uncertain	too	is	when	negotiations	will	begin,	with	reports	of	the	March	2017	 invocation	 of	 Article	 50	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	which	 constitutes	 the	 ‘starting	 gun’	 for	withdrawal	negotiations,	potentially	being	subject	to	delay.		And	what,	to	throw	something	of	a	wild	 card	 into	 this	 somewhat	unstable	 looking	house	of	 cards,	 are	 the	 implications	of	 the	November	 nomination	 of	 President-Elect	 Donald	 Trump?	 	We	 live,	 as	 the	 Chinese	 proverb	states,	in	interesting	times.				The	purpose	of	this	article	 is	 to	consider	the	potential	 implications	of	the	withdrawal	of	 the	UK	from	the	EU	for	a	specific	area	of	public	policy,	namely	intellectual	property	(hereafter	IP)	law	and	intellectual	property	rights	(IPRs),	guided	by	the	question	 ‘what	are	the	implications	
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of	 UK	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 EU	 for	 IP	 law	 and	 policy?’	 	 A	 number	 of	 alternatives	 to	 full	membership	have	been	proposed,	 from	membership	of	 the	European	Economic	Area	 (EEA)	similar	to	that	of	Norway,	Iceland	and	Liechtenstein,	to	a	series	of	bilateral	agreements	akin	to	those	made	with	Switzerland,	or	even	going	it	alone	under	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	rules.		As	this	article	will	demonstrate,	however,	under	all	these	options,	the	implications	for	IP-intensive	 sectors	 in	 the	UK	 are	 negative,	 ranging	 from	a	 loss	 of	 influence	 over	 laws	 that	may	 nevertheless	 bind	 it	 if	 it	 wishes	 to	 trade	with	 the	 EU,	 a	 loss	 of	 ability	 to	 influence	 IP	norms	 in	 its	 favour	 through	 international	 agreements,	 and	 a	 loss	 of	 access	 to	 specific	protections,	agencies	and	market	sectors	in	the	EU.			This	article	presents	a	new	contribution	to	the	analysis	of	the	implications	of	Brexit,	in	a	field	given	comparatively	little	attention	when	compared	 to	 issues	 such	 as	 financial	 regulation,	 services	 and	 passporting1	in	 which	 firms	based	outside	of	the	EU	can	set	up	a	subsidiary	in	the	UK	and	thereby	gain	access	to	capital	markets	 in	 the	 entire	 union	 (for	 more	 on	 passporting,	 see	 McCreevy	 2006;	 see	 also	 Black	2002).		However,	by	focusing	on	IPR	protection,	another	dimension	of	the	difficulties	the	UK	is	likely	to	experience	can	be	further	understood.		The	EU,	along	with	countries	such	as	the	US	and	Japan,	have	been	at	the	forefront	historically	of	 developing	 laws	 pertaining	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 IP	 assets,	 be	 they	 Hollywood	 movies,	pharmaceutical	products	or	brand	identities	such	as	McDonalds	or	Apple.		Loosely	categorised	as	a	 form	of	 ‘property’,	 IP	 is	ultimately	about	 the	protection	of	 intangible,	knowledge-based	assets.	 	While	 this	 undoubtedly	 causes	 some	 debate	 in	 the	 legal	 literature	 that	will	 not	 be	repeated	 here,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 article,	 it	 seems	 sufficient	 to	 define	 IP	 law	 as	 a	regulatory	system	seeking	to	afford	quasi-property	rights	to	knowledge-based	assets,	so	as	to																																																									1	This	article	does	not	expand	upon	 the	 issue	of	 financial	 services	 regulation	and	 the	Brexit	implications	as	it	is	largely	outwith	the	main	expertise	of	the	author,	but	has	been	considered	in	works	by	authors	such	as	Mugarura	(2016)	and	Yeoh	(2016)	
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derive	economic	benefit	 from	 them	(for	more	on	 the	 idea	of	 IP	as	 regulation,	 see	Patterson	1986).	 	The	three	main	forms	of	 IP	can	be	categorized	as	copyright,	which	protects	creative	expression	 such	 as	 film,	 literature	 and	 music;	 patent,	 which	 protects	 inventions	 or	innovations,	such	as	pharmaceuticals,	and	trade	mark,	which	protects	 the	brands,	 logos	and	by	extension	trading	reputation	of	undertakings.		IPRs	are	considered	as	a	valuable	business	asset,	as	well	as	of	fundamental	importance	to	the	economy	more	generally	(see	for	example	Hall	 2009;	 Posner	 2005).	 	 According	 to	 the	 UK’s	 Intellectual	 Property	 Office	 (IPO),	 the	governmental	agency	responsible	for	managing	the	registers	for	IP	rights	such	as	patents	and	trade	marks,	 in	 2011	 the	 value	 of	 IP	 assets	 protected	 by	 IPRs	 in	 the	 UK	 constituted	 £63.5	billion,	 equivalent	 to	4.2%	of	 the	UK’s	Gross	Domestic	Product	 (GDP)	 (Intellectual	Property	Office	 2015,	 p.3).	 	 In	 the	 EU,	 a	 report	 jointly	 written	 by	 the	 European	 Patent	 Office	 and	European	 Union	 Intellectual	 Property	 Office	 (EUIPO,	 previously	 the	 Office	 for	 the	Harmonization	 of	 the	 Internal	 Market,	 or	 OHIM)	 states	 that	 IPR-intensive	 industries	contribute	 26%	 of	 employment	 and	 39%	 of	 GDP	 in	 the	 EU	 (European	 Patent	 Office	 &	European	Union	Intellectual	Property	Office	2013,	p.6),	with	considerable	trade	between	the	UK	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 IP	 protected	 assets.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	argued,	these	IPR-intensive	sectors	are	a	key	asset	to	the	EU	(European	Commission	2011a,	pp.4–5),	 not	 only	 as	 a	 general	 guarantor	 of	 continued	 investment	 in	 knowledge	 and	innovation	to	the	benefit	of	European	society	(European	Commission	2010b,	pp.11–12),	but	as	a	specific	policy	lever	for	addressing	weaknesses	in	the	European	economy	in	light	of	the	Eurozone	crisis	(European	Commission	2011b,	pp.8–9;	European	Commission	2011a,	p.3).		It	is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	 Commission	 concluded	 in	 2011	 that	 the	 completion	 of	 a	 ‘single	market’	 for	 IPRs	 was	 essential	 to	 ensuring	 economic	 growth,	 job	 creation	 and	 the	 EU’s	continued	 competitiveness	 (European	 Commission	 2011a,	 p.6).	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	harmonization	and	integration	of	IP	laws	in	the	EU	has	constituted	an	important	dimension	of	
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the	EU’s	 internal	market	policies	and	 law-making,	with	the	UK	playing	an	active	part	 in	this	process.			This	article	adopts	a	predominantly	legal	analysis	of	the	implications	of	leaving	the	EU	for	the	UK’s	 IP	regime,	bringing	 in	consideration	of	Europeanization	and	the	EU’s	trade	relations	 in	order	to	better	assess	the	UK’s	ability	to	influence	IP	norms	in	the	future.		The	article	begins	by	 considering	 the	 immediate	 legal	 implications	 for	 the	UK	of	 leaving	 the	EU,	 including	 the	loss	of	 access	 to	 specialised	 legal	 regimes	 for	 the	protection	of	 trade	marks	and	patents,	 as	well	 as	 the	 potential	 loss	 of	 access	 to	 the	 digital	 single	 market	 for	 works	 protected	 by	copyright.		In	the	subsequent	section,	it	considers	just	how	‘independent’	the	UK’s	IP	laws	may	be	after	Brexit,	considering	the	implications	of	laws	and	norms	continuing	to	bind	the	UK	in	the	event	of	joining	the	EEA,	forming	bilateral	agreements,	or	acting	solely	under	WTO	rules,	in	 order	 to	demonstrate	 that	 even	absent	EU	membership,	 its	 IP	 laws	may	 still	 continue	 to	have	 effect	 in	 the	 UK.	 	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 this	 article	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 while	 the	 EU	exercises	considerable	trade	power,	and	indeed	power	through	trade,	the	UK	does	not	share	the	 same	privilege	as	a	 single	 state	–	 this	will	have	 significant	 implications	 for	negotiations	with	the	EU,	as	well	as	the	renegotiation	of	protections	with	states	where,	by	virtue	of	having	left	 the	 EU	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 trade	 agreements	 the	 EU	 is	 party	 to,	 the	 UK	 is	 no	 longer	protected	on	the	same	terms.	
	
Changing	relationships	with	the	EU:	-	the	substantive	implications	of	Brexit	for	IP	law		By	 leaving	the	EU,	regardless	of	the	form	that	this	separation	takes,	 there	will	be	significant	implications	for	the	UK’s	IP	laws.		The	first,	and	perhaps	most	problematic	for	the	UK,	will	be	the	loss	of	access	to	the	specialised	IP	agencies	and	systems	that	form	part	of	the	EU’s	acquis.		
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In	the	fields	of	trade	mark	and	patent,	IP	policy	has	moved	from	the	approximation	of	national	laws	so	as	to	 facilitate	market	 integration	(see	for	example	European	Commission	1976,	p.7	for	justifications	for	the	creation	of	an	EEC	trade	mark;	see	also	Kur	1997;	Dinwoodie	2013)	to	the	 establishment	 of	 supranational	 regimes.	 	 In	 the	 1990s,	 the	 then	 European	 Economic	Community	 (EEC)	 established	 the	 Community	 Trade	 Mark,	 by	 way	 of	 Council	 Regulation	No.40/94,	allowing	for	a	single	registration	at	the	Office	for	the	Harmonization	of	the	Internal	Market	 (OHIM)	 resulting	 in	 automatic	 protection	 in	 the	 entire	 EEC	 upon	 approval	 of	 the	application	 (for	more	 on	 the	 Community	 Trade	Mark,	 see	 Jehoram	 et	 al.	 2010,	 p.17).	 	 This	system	of	registration	has	been	codified	and	updated	with	the	establishment	of	the	EU	Trade	Mark	by	Regulation	2015/2424,	which	also	renamed	OHIM	the	European	Union	 Intellectual	Property	Office	(EUIPO).		This	‘unification	of	rights’	(Dinwoodie	2013,	p.87)	was	intended	to	ensure	 that	 impediments	 to	 trade	 through	 differences	 in	 legal	 rights	 in	 different	 member	states	 could	 be	 removed,	 ensuring	 that	 trade	 mark	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 issues	 of	territoriality	or	jurisdiction.		This	creates	a	problem	for	the	UK	upon	its	withdrawal	from	the	EU	–	the	EU	Trade	Mark	is	only	valid	within	the	EU	member	states.	 	This	means	that	British	firms	 that	have	 sought	only	a	Community	 (or	now	EU)	Trade	mark	without	also	 securing	a	national	trade	mark	will	be	required	to	apply	for	a	national	trade	mark	to	receive	protection	in	 the	UK,	unless	 the	British	Government	provides	 for	 the	automatic	granting	of	a	UK	mark	upon	 EU	 withdrawal;	 similarly,	 this	 could	 be	 problematic	 for	 non-UK	 based	 firms	 whose	brands	are	protected	by	the	EU	Trade	Mark,	who	may	need	to	apply	for	a	national	mark	in	the	UK.		This	is	already	the	case	for	EEA	states	Norway,	Iceland	and	Liechtenstein,	which	require	both	a	national	registration	and	subsequent	EU	trade	mark	registration,	as	EEA	members	are	not	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	EUIPO.		UK-based	firms	in	the	future	wishing	to	gain	Europe-wide	trade	mark	protection	will	have	to	apply	both	in	the	UK	for	a	national	mark	and	at	EUIPO	for	an	EU	Mark,	increasing	the	time	and	cost	of	application.	 	A	UK	registration	is	currently	a	
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minimum	 £170	 if	 performed	 online	 (Intellectual	 Property	 Office	 2016),	 with	 an	 EU	registration	costing	a	minimum	of	€850	(EUIPO	2016).		An	additional	benefit	of	the	EU	Trade	Mark,	according	to	Cook,	is	that	it	can	ensure	protection	in	Member	States	where	a	firm	may	not	 have	 a	 previously	 established	 reputation	 or	 consumer	 recognition,	 which	 may	 be	important	 in	 determining	 whether	 a	 sign	 is	 distinctive	 enough	 to	 be	 given	 trade	 mark	protection	 (2016);	by	adding	an	additional	 layer	of	 complication	 to	 the	application	process,	UK-based	firms	seeking	to	expand	into	European	markets	may	find	that	brand	distinctiveness	and	recognition	 in	 the	UK	may	not	be	sufficient	 for	EU	protection.	 	While	assessment	of	 the	potential	financial	implications	of	this	move	is	somewhat	difficult	to	quantify	at	this	juncture,	a	 joint	European	Patent	Office	(EPO)	and	EUIPO	report	published	in	October	2016	indicates	that	the	UK	has	filed	10,206	trade	mark	applications	at	the	EU	level	as	a	2011-2013	average,	rating	 as	 the	 second	 most	 frequent	 filer	 of	 applications	 (EPO	 and	 EUIPO	 2016,	 p.90).		Furthermore,	 trade	 mark	 intensive	 industries	 constitute	 a	 38.4%	 share	 of	 UK	 GDP,	 with	€762,325	 million	 value	 added	 and	 representing	 21.2%	 of	 national	 employment	 (EPO	 and	EUIPO	2016,	p.82).		The	loss	of	access	to	the	EU	Trade	Mark	on	its	current	terms	will	no	doubt	have	financial	as	well	as	legal	implications.		With	 regard	 to	 patents,	 a	 measure	 supported	 by	 the	 UK	 was	 the	 creation	 (by	 enhanced	cooperation)	 of	 the	 EU	 ‘unitary’	 patent	 and	 specialised	 court	 (Barnier	 2012),	 which	would	allow	for	the	granting	of	a	patent	with	automatic	validity	in	the	entirety	of	the	EU,	excluding	Spain,	 which	 opted	 out	 of	 the	 regime	 (West	 et	 al.	 2013,	 p.105).	 	 This	 system	 would	 run	alongside	 the	 existing	national	 patent	 grants	 or	 ‘bundle	 of	 patents’	 that	 could	be	 sought	by	firms	under	the	European	Patent	Convention	through	the	EPO,	an	international	organization	outwith	the	EU	system	which	the	UK	will	remain	party	to	subsequent	to	EU	withdrawal	(for	more	on	 the	 functioning	of	 the	patent,	 see	Christou	2013;	 see	also	Kaesling	2013).	 	The	UK	
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was	 instrumental	 in	 securing	 the	 patent,	 particularly	 in	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 European	Union	(Pagenberg	2013),	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	one	of	the	central	divisions	of	the	Unified	Patent	Court	(UPC)	was	to	be	situated	in	London,	under	Article	7	of	the	UPC	Agreement.	 	By	leaving	the	EU,	the	existence	of	the	EU’s	unitary	patent	is	in	doubt;	as	the	regime	is	only	open	to	 membership	 of	 EU	 Member	 States,	 and	 not	 EEA	 members,	 the	 UK	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	participate,	 and	 legislation	 establishing	 the	 regime	may	need	 to	be	 rewritten	 in	 light	 of	 the	UK’s	withdrawal.	 	 It	may	be,	however,	 that	without	 the	 influence	of	 the	UK,	 impetus	 for	 the	further	 integration	 of	 IP	 in	 the	 internal	market	 is	 reduced,	 as	well	 as	 serving	 to	 jeopardize	existing	 integration	 measures.	 	 Tilman	 argues	 that	 the	 unitary	 patent	 project	 could	nevertheless	proceed	by	the	UK	ratifying	the	Agreement	prior	to	exiting	the	EU,	allowing	for	the	UPC	to	become	operative,	and	then	entering	into	an	agreement	to	continue	membership	of	the	system	by	means	of	a	Protocol	after	it	leaves	(2016).		However,	Dunlop	argues	that	this	is	highly	 unlikely	 –	more	 likely	 is	 that	 if	 the	 EU	wishes	 to	 continue	with	 the	UPC	project,	 the	Agreement	 will	 have	 to	 be	 revised	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 UK’s	 withdrawal,	 and	 that	 the	unitary	patent	system	will	be	open	for	adoption	by	EU	Member	States	only	(2016).		The	result	is	 likely	 to	 be	 highly	 uncertain;	 with	 the	 UK	 being	 fourth	 in	 the	 EU	 in	 terms	 of	 patent	applications	 registered	 at	 the	 EPO	 (EPO	 and	 EUIPO	 2016,	 p.90)	 and	 patent	 intensive	industries	 representing	 13.3%	of	UK	GDP	 and	8.3%	of	 employment	 (EPO	 and	EUIPO	2016,	p.81),	this	uncertainty	is	likely	to	impact	upon	British	business.		In	 the	 field	 of	 copyright,	 the	 most	 pressing	 issue	 for	 the	 EU	 at	 this	 time	 has	 been	 the	facilitation	 in	 the	 cross-border	 sales	 of	 digital	 media,	 be	 it	 in	 the	 form	 of	 music	 or	 eBook	downloads,	 or	 access	 to	 legal	 streaming	 services	 such	 as	 Netflix	 (European	 Commission	2010a;	 European	 Commission	 2015a;	 Farrand	 2016a).	 	 Unlike	 trade	 mark,	 there	 is	 no	supranational	copyright	system	in	the	EU,	only	the	approximation	of	national	 laws	(Farrand	
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2015;	 Hugenholtz	 2012).	 	 Therefore,	 copyright	 is	 still	 territorial	 in	 nature,	 and	 subject	 to	enforcement	in	national	jurisdictions.		While	the	Court	of	Justice	has	sought	to	ensure	that	the	exercise	of	 IP	rights	cannot	serve	as	a	barrier	 to	 the	 free	movement	of	physical	goods	since	cases,	 the	 situation	 is	 more	 complicated	 when	 applied	 to	 digital	 media,	 which	 is	 instead	classified	as	a	service	(Dreier	2013),	which	can	be	subject	to	territorial	restrictions	in	order	to,	 for	example,	 effectively	 calculate	 royalty	payments	 (Mazziotti	2010).	 	Nevertheless,	with	the	widespread	usage	of	the	Internet	for	the	dissemination	of	copyright	protected	works,	this	territoriality	 has	 been	 recognized	 by	 the	 Commission	 as	 an	 undesirable	 barrier	 to	 trade	(European	 Commission	 2010a)	 and	 that	 restricting	 access	 to	 digital	 media	 content	 by	geographical	 location,	so	 that	content	made	available	 in	 the	UK	 is	only	accessible	 in	 the	UK,	significantly	hinders	the	establishment	of	a	‘pan-European’	market	for	digital	media	services	(European	Commission	2015a,	 pp.6–7).	 	 The	UK	has	been	a	 strong	proponent	of	 creating	 a	single	market	 for	 the	sale	and	access	of	 copyright	protected	digital	media	 (HM	Government	2014,	 p.35),	 as	 have	 representatives	 of	 the	 British	 creative	 industries,	 which	 believe	 that	further	integration	of	the	(digital)	single	market	would	result	 in	increased	economic	growth	and	 a	 wider	 customer	 base	 (HM	 Government	 2014,	 pp.80–81).	 	 In	 the	 event	 that	 the	 UK	withdraws	 from	 the	 EU	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 EEA	 relationship,	 then	 the	UK	 is	 likely	 to	 retain	access	 to	 this	 formative	 Digital	 Single	 Market.	 	 The	 Commission	 has	 indicated	 that	 the	proposed	legislation,	including	a	Regulation	ensuring	the	cross-border	‘portability’	of	content,	allowing	 for	users	 to	access	 content	 legally	available	 in	 their	home	state	when	 travelling	 to	another	Member	State,	has	EEA	relevance	(European	Commission	2015b,	p.10),	which	means	that	members	of	the	EEA	will	be	required	to	adopt	that	legislation	in	order	to	be	able	to	trade	with	the	EU.		However,	in	the	event	that	the	UK	instead	opts	for	bilateral	relations	with	the	EU	similar	to	the	Switzerland	model,	a	customs	union,	or	alternatively	on	the	basis	of	operating	under	WTO	rules	only,	 the	UK	will	 lose	access	 to	 the	potentially	 lucrative	single	market	 for	
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digital	media	 services.	 	UK-based	 consumers	would	not	be	able	 to	 access	UK-based	 content	when	travelling	in	the	EU,	and	EU-based	consumer	happening	to	be	temporarily	present	in	the	UK	would	not	be	able	to	access	EU-based	content.		While	harder	to	calculate	than	trade	mark	or	patent,	as	copyright	is	an	unregistered	right,	it	is	nevertheless	worth	stating	that	copyright	intensive	 industries	 contribute	 8.4%	 of	 UK	 GDP,	 with	 a	 value	 of	 €167,683	 million	 and	employing	6.3%	of	the	working	population	(EPO	and	EUIPO	2016,	p.84).		Finally,	withdrawing	 from	 the	EU	would	have	 implications	 for	enforcement	of	 IP	 rights	due	not	only	to	loss	of	access	to	the	EUIPO,	but	loss	of	access	to	Europol,	which	only	provides	full	membership	for	EU	members	(Larsson	2006).		While	it	may	be	argued	that	the	main	activity	of	the	EUIPO	is	in	its	role	as	the	agency	responsible	for	the	EU	Trade	Mark,	the	EUIPO	is	also	home	to	the	European	Observatory	on	Infringements	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights,	which	is	responsible	for	sharing	best	practices	in	identifying,	monitoring	and	countering	infringements	of	IP	carried	out	on	a	commercial	scale,	such	as	counterfeiting	(author	withheld,	forthcoming	2016).		The	European	Observatory’s	work	in	particular	on	centralising	information	regarding	identifying	 alleged	 counterfeiters	 operating	 on	 the	 Internet	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 injunctions	and	 initiation	 of	 legal	 action	 in	 the	 different	 Member	 States	 (European	 Observatory	 on	Counterfeiting	and	Piracy	2010,	pp.3–5)	is	based	on	exchanges	of	expertise	between	national	agencies	 (European	Commission	2009,	p.6),	expertise	which,	 in	 the	event	of	 leaving	 the	EU,	the	UK	would	not	 longer	have	access	to.	 	Furthermore,	Europol	has	been	collaborating	with	the	 European	 Observatory	 in	 identifying	 key	 counterfeit	 markets	 and	 countries	 of	 origin,	again	working	with	national	authorities	in	order	to	develop	training	in	countering	commercial	scale	infringement.		Information	exchange	between	national	agencies	becomes	essential,	due	to	 ‘the	 internet	 is	 the	 most	 significant	 enabler	 for	 the	 distribution	 of	 counterfeit	 goods,	because	 of	 […]	 its	 ability	 to	 operate	 across	 various	 jurisdictions,	 and	 its	 potential	 for	
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presenting	 sophisticated	 replicas	 of	 official	 web	 shops’	 (European	 Observatory	 on	Infringements	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 and	 Europol	 2015,	 p.5),	 which	 may	 target	consumers	 in	one	particular	Member	State,	but	be	 identified	as	a	site	selling	counterfeits	 in	another	Member	State.			As	many	of	these	goods	sold	come	from	outside	the	EU,	but	are	sent	directly	to	the	purchaser	in	small	consignments,	rather	than	the	traditional	means	of	bringing	counterfeit	goods	 into	a	 country	 in	order	 to	 sell	 in	physical	black	markets	 (see	 for	example	Schneider	 &	Maillefer	 2015),	 the	 identification	 and	 seizure	 of	 these	 consignments	 requires	effective	data	exchange	between	national	agencies.		While	countries	such	as	Norway	do	have	cooperation	agreements	with	Europol	despite	not	being	EU	Member	States,	as	evidenced	by	the	Agreement	between	the	Kingdom	of	Norway	and	the	European	Police	Office	that	entered	into	 force	 in	 2001,	 Article	 2	 specifically	 outlines	 the	 types	 of	 offence	 in	which	 cooperation	between	the	national	and	European	agencies	is	permitted.		Whereas	piracy	and	counterfeiting	are	identified	as	areas	of	‘cybercrime’	in	the	European	Convention	on	Cybercrime,	IP-related	crimes	are	not	included	in	Article	2	of	the	Agreement.		Switzerland,	the	non-EEA	country	with	the	closet	relationship	with	the	EU	also	has	a	cooperation	agreement,	but	again	under	Article	3,	these	does	not	apply	to	IP-related	offences,	meaning	information	exchange	in	these	fields	is	somewhat	unlikely.		Losing	access	to	these	central	repositories	of	expertise	in	the	EUIPO	and	Europol	may	negatively	impact	the	ability	of	the	UK	to	effectively	counter	IP	infringements.		It	may	therefore	be	concluded	that	the	impacts	upon	IP	law	and	enforcement	for	the	UK	through	withdrawal	from	the	EU	are	both	substantial	and	potentially	serious.		
Boldly	independent,	or	bound	by	convention?		The	UK	and	IP	law	obligations	
	Yet	perhaps	the	 loss	of	access	to	these	agencies,	as	well	as	 to	these	IP-focused	markets,	 is	a	price	worth	paying	for	newly	sought	independence?		When	considering	IP,	it	would	seem	that	
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the	 UK	 is	 somewhat	 bound	 by	 convention.	 	 Let	 us	 start	 first	 with	 the	 ‘softer’	 exit	 option,	namely	 EEA	membership.	 	 This	 type	 of	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 would	 require	 the	 UK	 to	adopt	 certain	 Directives	 pertaining	 to	 IPRs,	 without	 the	 ability	 to	 influence	 their	 content.		Under	the	EEA	Agreement	Article	65(2),	EEA	states	are	required	to	adhere	to	provisions	on	the	 protection	 of	 ‘intellectual,	 industrial	 and	 commercial	 property,	which,	 unless	 otherwise	specified,	 shall	 apply	 to	 all	 products	 and	 services’.	 	 The	 list	 of	 laws	 requiring	 adoption	 is	included	in	Annex	XVII,	which	includes	Directive	2009/24/EC	on	the	protection	of	computer	programs,	 Directive	 2001/29/EC	 on	 the	 harmonisation	 of	 certain	 aspects	 of	 copyright	 and	related	rights	in	the	information	society,	Directive	2008/95/EC	on	the	approximation	of	laws	relating	 to	 trade	marks,	 and	Directive	98/44/EC	on	 the	 legal	protection	of	biotechnological	inventions.	 	 This	 admittedly	 will	 have	 no	 immediate	 effect	 on	 the	 UK,	 which	 has	 already	incorporated	 these	 laws	 into	 domestic	 legislation	 by	 virtue	 of	 its	 EU	membership.	 	 As	 they	have	been	incorporated	into	national	law,	they	continue	to	constitute	binding	legal	obligations	until	 such	 time	as	 the	UK	chooses	 to	repeal	 them,	a	 time-consuming	and	resource	 intensive	task	(Lazowski	2016,	pp.124–125).		This	does	have	implications,	however.		The	first	is	that	the	UK	will	have	no	flexibility	under	an	EEA	model	 to	make	significant	reforms	to	 its	 IP	 laws	 in	fields	 subject	 to	 EU	 harmonising	measures;	while	 there	 is	 no	 indication	 that	 the	UK	would	want	 substantial	 change	 in	 this	 area,	 or	 at	 least	 that	 the	 area	 was	 not	 considered	 salient	enough	to	be	discussed	in	pro-Leave	campaigning,	it	nevertheless	suggests	that	IP	would	not	be	 an	 area	 where	 the	 UK	would	 be	 able	 to	 strip	 away	 burdensome	 ‘red-tape’	 and	 achieve	‘control	of	our	own	laws’,	as	so	desired	by	leading	Brexit	figures	(Craig	2016,	p.456).	 	While	the	 decisions	 of	 the	 ECJ	 would	 not	 directly	 bind	 the	 EU	 if	 an	 EEA	 member,	 it	 would	nevertheless	be	subject	to	the	scrutiny	of	the	EFTA	Court,	which	can	issue	advisory	opinions	under	Protocol	35	of	 the	EEA	Agreement,	which	 requires	 that	 in	 conflicts	between	 the	EEA	Agreement	 and	 national	 law,	 the	 Agreement	 rules	 prevail	 (Burke	 et	 al.	 2016,	 p.80).		
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Furthermore,	 the	 EFTA	Court	 interacts	with	 the	 ECJ	 through	 a	 process	 of	 judicial	 dialogue,	deciding	 cases	 in	 line	with	 ECJ	 decisions	 (Baudenbacher	 2004),	 and	 furthermore,	 has	 been	shown	to	demonstrate	a	strong	integrationist	tendency	that	rivals	that	of	the	ECJ	(Fredriksen	2010b).		Furthermore,	the	UK	would	continue	to	be	bound	by	new	laws,	without	the	ability	to	influence	their	 content,	 indicating	 a	 loss	 of	 legal	 authority	 and	 influence,	 rather	 than	 a	 net	 gain	(Lazowski	2016,	p.120).	 	As	EU	 law	changes	 so	do	 the	obligations	of	 the	EEA,	which	has	 to	follow	and	adopt	all	 future	EU	laws	relevant	for	the	internal	market,	particularly	 in	areas	of	close	 integration	 (Tynes	 &	 Haugsdal	 2016,	 pp.761–762).	 	 During	 the	 negotiations	 for	 the	establishment	of	the	EEA	in	the	early	1990s,	Cotter	argued	that	being	able	to	fully	participate	in	decision-making	and	shaping	was	essential,	commenting	specifically	with	regard	to	IP	that	EEA	 states	 ‘could	 come	 into	 a	 position	 of	 mere	 approval	 and	 reception	 of	 laws	 to	 whose	creation	 they	do	not	have	any	sufficient	 say’	 (1991,	p.149),	 a	prediction	 largely	born	out	 in	subsequent	 IP	 law	 and	 policy-making	 (see	 generally	 Fredriksen	 2010a;	 Rognstad	 2016).		While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	 Commission	 wields	 the	 legislative	 agenda	 under	 the	 ordinary	legislative	 procedure	 on	 matters	 concerning	 the	 internal	 market,	 including	 IP	 law	 under	Article	118(1)	TFEU,	the	UK	has	significant	influence	in	the	EU	Council.		Through	a	process	of	deliberative	 intergovernmentalism	 (Puetter	 2014,	 pp.4–6),	 in	which	 the	 ability	 to	 influence	decision	 making	 is	 ‘dependent	 upon	 the	 ability	 to	 negotiate,	 compromise,	 build	alliances/consensus	 and	 be	 a	 reliable	 partner’	 (Copsey	 2007,	 p.14),	 the	 UK	 has	 wielded	considerable	influence,	both	being	on	the	‘winning’	side	of	negotiations	87%	of	the	time	and	UK	officials	being	at	the	heart	of	EU	bargaining,	constituting	the	best	connected	officials	in	the	Council	(Hix	2016,	pp.202–204).		Through	leaving	the	EU,	the	ability	to	shape	IP	laws	that	may	nevertheless	bind	it	will	be	severely	curtailed.			
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	In	the	event	of	choosing	not	to	pursue	the	EEA	option,	but	 instead	pursuing	subject-specific	bilateral	agreements	in	the	same	was	as	Switzerland	negotiates	with	the	EU	(Lavenex	2009),	facilitation	 of	 trade	 in	 IP	 protected	 materials	 such	 as	 digital	 media	 would	 require	 specific	agreements	 to	 be	 concluded.	 	 Over	 the	 space	 of	 40	 years,	 the	 EU	 has	 concluded	 just	 20	significant	 agreements	 with	 Switzerland	 on	 a	 range	 of	 subjects	 such	 as	 free	 movement	 of	persons,	civil	aviation	and	education,	as	well	as	100	minor	agreements	–	these	are	however	all	negotiated	sector	by	sector	(Gstöhl	2015)	in	a	form	of	‘non-adhesive	integration’	with	the	EU	legal	order	(Vallet	2012,	p.377),	also	referred	to	as	‘integration	without	membership’	(Vahl	&	Gromilund	2006).	 	However,	 this	process	 can	be	considered	slow,	 laborious	and	 technically	complex	(Burke	et	al.	2016;	Lazowski	2016).		If	the	process	of	EU-UK	negotiations	is	as	slow,	which	could	be	the	case	given	the	complexity	of	negotiations	and	the	limited	trade	expertise	currently	possessed	by	the	country,	 the	position	of	 IP-intensive	sectors	based	 in	 the	UK	but	trading	in	the	EU	may	be	one	of	an	uncomfortable	 limbo.	 	 It	 is	worth	commenting	here	that	the	repercussions	for	the	EU	may	not	be	so	negative	–	the	withdrawal	of	the	UK	may	allow	for	further	 and	 deeper	 integration	 of	 areas	 of	 IP	 such	 as	 copyright	 law,	 as	 has	 been	 argued	recently	by	some	academics	(see	Sinodinou	2016	for	one	example),	which	has	been	marked	by	 a	 difference	 between	 ‘Anglo-American’	 and	 ‘Continental’	 approaches	 that	 prioritise	differently	the	economic	dimension	and	‘moral’	dimension	of	copyright,	which	focuses	on	the	rights	 of	 the	 author	 as	 a	 person	 rather	 than	 purely	 on	 the	 financial	 element.	 	 Such	 an	argument	must	 be	made	 cautiously,	 however;	 this	 divergence	 in	 approach	 to	 copyright	 has	been	somewhat	exaggerated	(Strowel	1994),	and	while	the	UK	has	been	much	more	sceptical	of	deeper	integration	in	fields	such	as	Economic	and	Monetary	Policy	and	social	rights,	it	has	been	much	more	 supportive	of	market	 integration	 including	 in	 the	 field	of	 IP.	 	By	pursuing	such	 an	 option,	 the	 UK	 may	 be	 able	 to	 facilitate	 trade	 in	 IP-protected	 works	 through	
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regulatory	convergence	with	EU	IP	standards.		However,	such	an	approach	would	again	have	implications	 for	 UK	 ‘independence’.	 	 Swiss-EU	 relations	 are	 marked	 by	 a	 self-imposed	limitation	on	sovereignty,	with	Switzerland	harmonising	its	commercial	 laws	with	the	EU	so	as	to	facilitate	trade.		Internal	laws	pertaining	to	economic	matters	are	scrutinised	in	order	to	ensure	 compatibility	 with	 EU	 law	 resulting	 in	 a	 process	 of	 Europeanization	 without	institutionalisation,	 in	which	EU	 law	 is	 transposed	 through	 autonomous	 adaptation	 (Linder	2013,	p.191).		The	restriction	of	national	autonomy	this	necessitates,	however,	combined	with	the	reluctance	of	the	Swiss	population	to	engage	in	further	bilateral	negotiations	(particularly	in	light	of	migration-related	issues)	(Linder	2013,	p.199)	may	constitute	a	dark	omen	for	the	UK,	where	 a	 British	 population	 leaning	 towards	 a	 ‘hard’	 Brexit	may	 find	 even	 this	 level	 of	integration	unacceptable	–	indeed,	as	was	noted	in	2015	by	Joseph	Weiler,	it	is	‘the	very	idea	of	membership	in	a	Union	such	as	the	EU	which	at	the	end	of	the	day	simply	does	not	sit	well’	(Weiler	 2015,	 p.2).	 	 Suggesting	 a	 form	 of	 coordination	 with	 the	 EU	 in	 which	 EU	 laws	 are	adopted	without	any	say	in	their	drafting	may	not	be	politically	acceptable.		What	if	the	UK	pursued	a	WTO	or	Free	Trade	Agreement	approach?		Ultimately,	with	regard	to	IP	protection,	the	UK	would	still	find	its	ability	to	decide	its	own	laws	constrained.		At	the	international	level,	IP	is	protected	by	the	Agreement	on	Trade	Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	 Rights,	 or	 TRIPS,	 concluded	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 of	 GATT	 negotiations.		Ratification	of	TRIPS	is	a	pre-requisite	for	WTO	membership,	with	the	result	that	abidance	by	the	 TRIPS	 requirements	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 UK’s	membership	 of	 the	 organisation.	 	 Those	proponents	of	 a	WTO-only	 relationship	may	 find	however	 that	negotiations	are	 required	 to	redefine	its	legal	relationship	with	the	WTO,	albeit	that	the	UK	is	argued	to	already	constitute	a	member	of	the	WTO	independent	of	its	EU	membership,	with	its	own	rights	and	obligations	independent	of	 the	WTO	 in	 line	with	WTO	 jurisprudence	 (Bartels	2016,	pp.4–7).	 	However,	
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the	process	of	 ‘uncoupling’	 its	membership	 from	that	of	 the	EU	may	nevertheless	be	 legally	and	politically	complex	(Ungphakorn	2016).		‘Mere’	renegotiation	of	the	schedules	of	the	WTO	is	 by	 no	 means	 a	 straightforward	 or	 speedy	 process	 (Williams	 2008),	 with	 former	 WTO	official	Peter	Ungphakorn	stating	that	British	renegotiation	is	‘not	impossible,	but	it	won’t	be	sorted	 out	 quickly’	 (Beattie	 2016).	 	 Internationally,	 then,	 the	 UK’s	 position	 in	 the	 world	trading	order,	and	its	status	as	party	to	the	TRIPS	Agreement	are	both	indeterminate	–	while	undoubtedly	TRIPS-compliant	as	a	nation,	the	UK	may	nevertheless	find	its	grey	legal	status	uncomfortable	if	it	determined	that	formal	accession	to	the	WTO	and	ratification	of	TRIPS	as	an	 individual	 state	party	 is	deemed	necessary.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	UK	 is	 also	a	member	of	 the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organization	(WIPO)	and	will	remain	subject	to	its	treaties,	such	as	the	WIPO	Copyright	Treaty	and	WIPO	Performances	and	Phonograms	Treaty	by	means	of	national	 incorporation	 of	 the	 provisions	 by	 way	 of	 the	 Information	 Society	 Directive	(2001/29/EC),	 although	 as	 ratification	 was	 performed	 by	 the	 EU	 under	 its	 exclusive	competence	in	external	trade	issues	under	Article	218(3)	TFEU,	the	UK	will	likely	need	to	re-examine	and	potentially	renegotiate	the	terms	of	 international	agreements	should	it	wish	to	either	withdraw	 from	 them,	 or	 ratify	 as	 an	 independent	 state,	 a	 laborious	 and	 complicated	process	(Koutrakos	2015,	p.2).		However,	as	the	next	section	of	this	article	will	demonstrate,	(re)negotiation	of	agreements	with	other	states	may	pose	something	of	a	difficulty	for	the	UK.		
Cast	Adrift?		Brexit	and	a	global	loss	of	influence	over	IP	law	and	norms	
	What	if	the	UK	attempted	to	negotiate	something	akin	to	a	Free	Trade	Agreement	(FTA)	with	the	 EU	 with	 principles	 pertaining	 to	 IP?	 	 Under	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Lisbon,	 the	 EU’s	 Common	Commercial	 Policy	 (CCP)	 was	 expanded	 to	 include	 specific	 exclusive	 competence	 over	commercial	 aspects	 of	 IP	 protection	 (Müller-Graff	 2008,	 p.190),	 now	 covered	 by	 Article	
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207(1)	TFEU.		In	the	interest	of	achieving	a	uniform	approach	to	trade	liberalization,	Member	States	have	 in	effect	 transferred	their	competences	to	conclude	trade	agreements	to	the	EU,	meaning	that	they	are	unable	to	conclude	bilateral	or	plurilateral	agreements	with	third	states	unless	specifically	empowered	to	by	the	EU	institutions.	 	The	EU	wields	not	only	formidable	power	in	trade,	but	formidable	power	through	trade	(Meunier	&	Nicolaïdis	2006),	constitutive	of	 a	 deep	 trade	 agenda	 aimed	 at	 ensuring	 that	 EU-based	 firms	 are	 able	 to	 reap	 substantial	benefits	 from	 trade	 liberalization	while	 protecting	 and	 facilitating	 its	 own	policy	 objectives	and	preferences	internally.		As	Araujo	has	put	it,	‘it	is	globalization	on	the	EU’s	terms’	(2016,	p.46).	 	 The	 EU	 has	 conducted	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 FTAs	 and	 Stability	 and	 Association	Agreements	(SAAs)	that	have	trade	dimensions	with	states	and	regions,	including	agreements	in	 force	 such	 as	 with	 South	 Korea,	 Jordan	 and	 Lebanon	 as	 well	 as	 countries	 in	 the	 EU’s	neighbourhood	 such	as	Albania,	Moldova,	Montenegro	 and	Kosovo.	 	 Should	 the	UK	attempt	the	negotiation	of	 such	an	agreement	with	 the	EU,	 it	may	 find	 that	 the	EU’s	power	 through	trade,	 representing	 a	 bloc	 of	 27	 states	 upon	 which	 the	 UK	 substantially	 depends	 upon	economically,	results	in	the	negotiation	being	on	the	EU’s	terms.				A	 number	 of	 agreements	 have	 been	 concluded	 (but	 only	 provisionally	 applied	 pending	successful	ratification	of	all	parties)	with	countries	such	as	Colombia,	Peru	and	the	Ukraine,	as	well	 as	 agreements	 with	 regions	 such	 as	 the	 Central	 American	 trade	 agreement	 with	 six	Central	 American	 states,	 and	 the	 Caribbean	 Forum	 Economic	 Partnership	 Agreement.		Furthermore,	the	EU	is	currently	negotiating	or	concluding	trade	agreements	with	the	US	(the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	 Investment	Partnership),	 although	 its	 status	 is	debatable	 given	 the	election	 of	 Donald	 Trump,	 Canada	 (the	 Comprehensive	 Economic	 and	 Trade	 Agreement),	which	now	appears	to	be	ready	for	ratification,	Japan,	and	African	regions	such	as	the	Eastern	African	Community.		While	agreements	such	as	those	concluded	with	Colombia,	Peru	and	the	
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Caribbean	Forum	undoubtedly	provide	some	benefits	for	those	nations,	the	main	benefit	is	for	the	IP-intensive	sectors	 in	the	EU,	which	gain	protections	and	rules	 for	enforcement	that	go	far	beyond	the	standards	provided	for	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement	(see	generally	Maskus	2013).		This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 for	 developing	 sectors	 such	 as	 the	 protection	 of	 geographical	indications	 of	 origin,	 a	 sui	 generic	 form	 of	 protection	 for	 agricultural	 products	 deemed	 to	possess	intrinsic	qualities,	such	as	feta	cheese,	prosciutto	di	parma	or	Portuguese	linguíça	(on	GIs	 see	 Blakeney	 2014;	 Calboli	 2015),	 identified	 as	 a	 key	 ‘offensive’	 interest	 in	 trade	agreements	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 (Farrand	 2016b).	 	 GI	 protected	 foodstuffs	 are	 of	considerable	 financial	value	 to	 the	EU	and	 its	agricultural	producers,	worth	€15.8	billion	 in	2012	with	an	increase	in	sale	value	between	2005	and	2010	of	19%	(Chever	et	al.	2012,	p.16).		The	EU	has	adopted	a	position	of	exporting	its	norms	for	the	protection	of	GIs	by	way	of	trade	agreements,	ensuring	the	protection	of	EU-produced	products	such	as	Feta	in	third	countries,	ensuring	that	only	those	cheeses	produced	within	the	EU	subject	to	the	requirements	of	the	GI	regime	 can	 use	 the	 name	 Feta.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 EU-South	 Korea	 Free	 Trade	 Agreement	contains	in	Annex	10.A	a	list	of	products	that	must	be	afforded	GI	protection	in	South	Korea,	which	includes	products	such	as	French	cheeses,	Italian	cured	meats	and	Czech	beers.		While	there	are	no	 specific	British	products	 listed,	what	 is	 apparent	 is	 the	 reciprocal	nature	of	GI	protection,	with	an	agreement	that	certain	EU-based	GIs	will	be	respected	in	South	Korea,	and	vice	 versa.	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 exporting	 its	 norms	 on	 IP	 protection	throughout	 the	 world	 have	 been	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 collective	 bargaining	 power	 as	 an	economically	 dominant	 regional	 bloc	 able	 to	 offer	 ‘sweeteners’	 to	 (often,	 but	 not	 always)	developing	 countries	 as	 a	means	 of	 ensuring	 compliance	with	 EU	 IP	 laws	 (see	 for	 example	Jaeger	2013,	pp.203–204).		It	is	debatable	whether	the	UK	acting	as	a	single	state	without	the	collective	power	of	the	EU	would	have	the	same	capacity	to	influence	IP	norms.		
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The	United	Kingdom	is	unlikely	to	be	able	to	match	this	ability	to	export	IP	norms	by	way	of	trade	agreements	 subsequent	 to	 leaving	 the	EU.	 	This	 is	 for	 two	key	 reasons;	 the	 first	 is	an	issue	of	expertise,	and	the	second	an	issue	of	importance.		On	the	topic	of	expertise,	with	the	negotiation	of	trade	agreements	constituting	an	exclusive	EU	competence,	the	UK	has	had	less	need	to	employ	trade	negotiators	at	the	Foreign	Office,	and	as	a	result,	needs	to	hire	a	large	number	of	staff	to	fulfil	this	role	(Rutter	&	White	2016).		The	UK	currently	has	a	civil	service	that	 is,	 according	 to	 one	 source,	 under-staffed,	 demoralised,	 and	 lacking	 in	 trade-related	expertise	(Barnard	2016,	p.485).	 	The	government	has	estimated	that	it	will	need	to	employ	approximately	700-750	negotiators,	both	for	its	complex	and	time-critical	deliberations	with	the	 EU,	 as	well	 as	 to	 begin	 to	 establish	 trade	 agreements	with	 extra-communitarian	 states	(Parker	 et	 al.	 2016).	 	 This	 comparative	 lack	 of	 expertise	 puts	 the	 UK	 at	 a	 significant	disadvantage	 when	 negotiating	 the	 terms	 of	 its	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 EU,	 which	 would	presumably	also	include	provisions	concerning	the	protection	of	IP,	particularly	as	it	relates	to	the	free	movement	of	goods	and	services.	 	However,	given	the	likelihood	that	the	UK	will	have	more	pressing	 issues	 to	discuss	with	 the	EU,	such	as	 the	conditions	 for	market	access,	the	(unlikely)	compromises	on	the	free	movement	of	people	while	retaining	access	to	markets	for	 goods,	 services	 and	 capital	 and	 the	 passporting	 of	 UK-based	 financial	 firms,	 IP	 law	 is	unlikely	to	be	considered	high	priority	to	negotiators.		It	also	has	significant	implications	for	the	 UK’s	 negotiation	 of	 agreements	 with	 other	 states.	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 international	agreements	the	UK	is	party	to	by	way	of	its	membership	of	the	EU	will	cease	to	apply	for	the	UK	subsequent	to	its	withdrawal.		Should	CETA	be	ratified	and	enter	into	force,	for	example,	the	UK	will	no	longer	be	a	party	to	it;	the	same	applies	equally	to	the	existing	EU	agreement	with	South	Korea.		In	order	to	benefit	from	the	same	IP	protections	it	currently	enjoys	under	these	agreements,	the	UK	will	have	to	renegotiate	with	those	states.		The	difficulty	for	the	UK	is	its	lack	of	trade	expertise	at	this	point	in	time,	compounded	by	the	reality	that	while	it	may	
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represent	 an	 attractive	market,	 it	 does	 not	 have	 the	 same	 trade	 attractiveness	 (and	 indeed	negotiating	power)	as	a	large	trade	bloc	such	as	the	EU	(Lazowski	2016).		Indeed,	at	the	time	of	writing,	 a	number	of	 states,	 including	Australia,	Brazil,	Canada,	 and	 India,	have	 indicated	that	 they	have	no	 immediate	plans	 to	enter	 into	negotiations	 for	 trade	agreements	with	 the	UK,	 and	 certainly	 not	 before	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 EU	 is	 clarified	 (see	 for	 example	Giles	2016;	The	Economist	2016).	
	
Concluding	thoughts	
	If	this	article	appears	somewhat	negative	in	its	assessment	of	the	potential	impacts	upon	the	UK	as	a	result	of	the	decision	to	leave	the	EU,	it	is	due	to	the	unfortunate	conclusion	that	this	withdrawal	harms	the	UK	more	than	it	does	the	EU.	 	While	the	UK	has	served	as	a	driver	of	further	integration	of	IP	 laws	in	the	EU	due	to	its	support	of	its	market	goals	(that	have	not	necessarily	translated	into	other	policy	areas),	the	potential	loss	of	impetus	for	integration	is	a	setback	for	the	EU	that	pales	in	comparison	to	the	loss	of	influence	and	protection	that	the	UK	may	suffer	as	a	result	of	this	decision.		In	an	era	of	increased	global	trade	competition,	one	of	the	biggest	strengths	of	the	EU	in	its	norm	exportation	and	securing	of	regional	interests	has	been	 the	 ability	 to	 act	 collectively	 as	 part	 of	 an	 economic	 bloc,	 a	 strength	 that	 the	 UK	independently	does	not	share.		Furthermore,	if	the	UK	wishes	to	secure	access	to	the	internal	market,	 it	may	nevertheless	be	bound	by	 IP	 laws	 it	 has	 little	 ability	 to	 shape.	 	 Finally,	with	withdrawal	from	the	EU	comes	loss	of	access	to	systems	of	protection	such	as	the	EU	Trade	Mark,	a	loss	of	access	to	agencies	sharing	expertise	and	enforcement	information	such	as	the	EUIPO	and	Europol,	and	the	creation	of	legal	uncertainties	regarding	its	ability	to	access	the	digital	single	market.		Furthermore,	the	UK	will	find	that	its	sovereignty	post-Brexit	is	not	as	evident	as	 it	may	believe	as	 it	pertains	 to	 IPRs,	with	a	number	of	 existing	 legal	obligations,	
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including	 under	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	 which	 the	 UK	 is	 required	 to	 comply	 with,	 unless	 it	seeks	 to	 also	 leave	 the	 WTO.	 	 With	 the	 need	 to	 renegotiate	 certain	 other	 international	agreements	 the	EU	 is	already	part	of,	but	without	 the	 force	of	a	28	state	bloc	behind	 it,	UK	based	 IP-intensive	 firms	 may	 find	 that	 they	 face	 a	 period	 of	 significant	 uncertainty	 with	regard	to	how,	if	at	all,	key	sectors	will	be	protected	post-Brexit.		While	it	may	be	bold,	the	UK	may	find	that	its	position	with	regard	to	IPRs	is	not	so	independent;	instead,	it	runs	the	risk	of	being	politically	isolated,	and	legally	cut	adrift.		
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